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5 ~~January~~ FEBRUARY 1965

DRAFT DCI BRIEFING FOR
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

I. The Intelligence Community has recently completed the annual series of important estimates on the principal components of Soviet military power.

A. These estimates conclude that there have been significant changes in the direction of certain Soviet military programs, including a marked movement toward achieving quality improvements.

II. Let me preface these conclusions by saying that we have a high degree of confidence in these estimates because--for the last two or three years and particularly this year--they rest on a base ~~these~~ of evidence which is broader and far more solid than any we have had before.

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B. Because we consider it vital that this committee be able to judge the validity of our conclusions, I wish to brief you today on the product of our program of satellite photography. The sensitivity of this source of intelligence requires both a word of caution and some explanation of how the system works.

III. We consider the satellite reconnaissance program so worthwhile--and so sensitive--that even within the Intelligence Community only a small and essential proportion of our personnel have access to the resultant intelligence. Not only the product, but the actual existence of this program is guarded by a special classification which is higher than Top Secret.

IV. The program has been under active development for several years. It has cost a great deal of money, but the information it gives us is unique and so valuable that we believe it more than justifies the cost.

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CONCLUSIONS

I. To summarize our major conclusions, it is apparent that the Soviets are pursuing a dynamic, progressive military program, with advances under way in almost all important sectors of their military power. It is a sophisticated program directed more toward quality than toward quantity. In my personal opinion, there is always the possibility that the program we have observed might achieve a breakthrough of some sort which could redress the present balance of power. Specifically, we find that:

1. New and improved ICBMs are being developed, and hardened launchers are being deployed in a dispersed pattern.
2. Tactical strike forces, ground and air, are being equipped with increasingly advanced and more powerful weapons, both nuclear and conventional.
3. The Soviets are producing new and improved submarines with increased capabilities, equipped with both cruise and ballistic missiles. They are increasingly capable of long-range operations.
4. Antiaircraft defenses are being strengthened.
5. The Soviets are energetically pursuing research and development on antiballistic

missile systems. Some ABM deployment may already be under way.

6. There is a strong possibility that the Soviets are directing their efforts toward an anti-satellite capability.

7. Facilities for the production of special nuclear materials for weapons are being expanded.

II. Few if any of these appear to be crash programs, but they do reflect a dynamic effort--an insistent determination to achieve qualitative advances in military power which will assure the national security and international strategic power of the USSR.

SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

I. Despite the rapid and costly development of Soviet strategic attack and defense forces, the ground, tactical air, naval, and military transport forces, often referred to as general purpose forces, are still the largest and most expensive component of the Soviet military establishment.

II. The Soviets continue to retain a large number of line divisions--we estimate between 120 and 140. Sixty to 75 are at full strength. The

rest are at reduced or cadre strength.

(MAP, Deployment of Soviet army divisions)

A. Deployment is concentrated mainly in the European area, confronting NATO. East Germany alone has 20 Soviet divisions.

B. The size of divisions has been reduced in recent years, and most of them have been reorganized into tank and motorized rifle divisions. All of them are small by Western standards, and their support is very light.

(PHOTOS, FROG, Scud, Shaddock)

1. Conventional artillery has been cut back sharply in favor of tactical missiles and Honest-John type rockets with nuclear and chemical warheads, some of which you see here.

2. These changes give emphasis to mobility and shock at the expense of staying power.

(CHART, Soviet armed forces manpower by purpose)

III. We estimate the strength of Soviet general purpose forces at 1.8 to 1.9 million men, out of a total force of 2.8 to 2.9 million. These

figures are a bit lower than our estimates in previous years, but this reflects more a reappraisal of intelligence than any major reduction by demobilization. There has been some slight demobilization since 1961.

IV. Tactical air power continues to play an important role, mainly for air defense of Soviet ground forces.

(CHART, Soviet aircraft by mission)

A. Tactical air forces currently have about 3,250 aircraft in operational use. Most are interceptor types, but some could deliver nuclear weapons.

B. We have noted a steady addition of new supersonic aircraft to tactical air units, with first priority going to Soviet regiments in East Germany.

V. Modernization of the general-purpose forces will continue in the future. Recent trends point to Soviet efforts to improve the non-nuclear capabilities of their ground forces. By 1970, the USSR will probably reduce the number of divisions slightly, but may keep a greater proportion in combat-ready status.

A. In addition, we may have seen the first steps toward Soviet acquisition of a real capability for the rapid mounting of limited long-distance military actions: air and sea lift is being improved, there is a greater emphasis on airborne operations, and a marine corps has been re-established. This is an entirely new development, because until now Soviet military forces have been landlocked, without combat sea lift and with no air lift of any significance.

VI. We have detected significant changes in the military forces of the East European satellites in the past several years.

A. The European satellites can contribute about a million men and more than 30 full-strength divisions to Warsaw Pact needs.

B. Increasingly over the past two years, the Soviets have been giving these satellite forces very modern weapons, such as tactical missiles and rockets, and new models of fighter aircraft.

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SOVIET STRATEGIC STRIKE FORCES

I. The first element of Soviet strategic strike forces is Long Range Aviation, a Soviet version of SAC, with 66,000 personnel, 200 heavy bombers, and nearly 900 medium bombers.

A. Heavy bombers are still a significant part of Soviet capabilities for intercontinental attack. The USSR could put about 100 heavy bombers over the US on two-way missions. In addition, up to 150 medium bombers could arrive over North American targets on two-way missions, but such attacks would be limited in range to targets in Greenland, Canada, Alaska, and the extreme northwestern US.

1. The Air Force estimate of the two-way bomber threat is somewhat higher; the Air Force also estimates a considerably greater threat to the US based on the extensive use of one-way missions. We do not exclude the latter possibility, but consider it increasingly unlikely as Soviet ICBM and missile submarine forces grow.

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B. The Soviets have the Blinder, a medium bomber with supersonic dash, in production. There are now between 50 and 75 of these in Long Range Aviation, and we believe the number will increase over the years ahead.

(PHOTO, Close-up of Gomel bomber airfield)

1. This photograph of a Soviet military airfield shows 12 of these Blinders, as well as one Badger medium at the extreme right, and one old B-29 type, a TU-4, parked in a field at the upper right.

C. We have no evidence that the USSR is developing a new heavy bomber, but the Air Force believes the Soviets will introduce a new heavy bomber by 1968, and a new medium bomber by 1970.

II. The Soviet Union's principal strategic threat, the Strategic Rocket Force, has 100,000 picked men manning intercontinental, intermediate, and medium-range ballistic missile units.

(MAP, Soviet ICBM deployment)

A. We estimate that the present Soviet ICBM capability is about 220 operational launchers. The Air Force makes a larger allowance for undetected launchers and estimates a somewhat larger number of operational launchers. The red and black stars on this map are the 18 large established missile complexes we have been watching since early 1962. The circles are new complexes, under construction for the past year or so.

(MAP, Location of Soviet missile test ranges)

B. The Soviets have long maintained an extensive missile testing program. This map locates some of the important missile test areas--the ICBM and space launch center at Tyuratam, the MRBM and IRBM testing area at Kapustin Yar, and the SAM and ABM test center at Sary Shagan.

(CHART, Soviet ICBM tests, 1957-1964)

III. This chart shows Soviet ICBM tests from 1957 through 1964. Altogether, counting the record for 1965 to date, there have been 213 test firings of all five types of missiles. The record shows 171 successes, 39 failures, and three unresolved.

A. ICBM testing began with the SS-6 in 1957. Only four launchers were deployed for this system.

B. The SS-7 has had only 14 failures in 89 firings, and is the most widely deployed of the Soviet operational ICBMs.

(PHOTO, SS-8 in parade)

C. The missile in this picture is the SS-8, appearing in the latest November Parade in Moscow. It is the first ICBM ever displayed by the Soviets. The SS-8 was developed just after the SS-7, and has been deployed to only a small number of launchers. It may soon be phased out of the operational inventory.

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IV. The Soviets are pursuing a dynamic ICBM program designed to improve their relative strategic position. They do not appear to be trying to match us in numbers. I believe they may be hoping for a breakthrough in strategic offensive or defensive systems which would offset our existing quantitative advantage.

A. During the past year there have been two significant developments in the Soviet ICBM field. One of these is the advent of a third generation of missiles.

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Over the past year, the Soviets have begun to test yet a third generation of ICBMs--the SS-9 and SS-10. The SS-9 has had a fair test record--three failures in 17 firings--and we think it will become operational soon.

The SS-10 has also done well in tests--one failure out of eight shots--and probably will be deployed later in 1965.

We believe that Soviet design teams are also working on a very large ICBM capable of delivering a 100-megaton warhead, and they may be developing a small ICBM with improved propellants--possibly solid.

V. In addition to the 220 or so launchers which are operational, more are under construction, some of them for the SS-9 and SS-10. We estimate that:

A. By the middle of this year, there will be about 260 operational launchers.

B. Looking farther into the future, we believe that there will be between 400 and 700 launchers by mid-1970. The Air Force, on the other hand, estimates 600 to 900 ICBM launchers by then.

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VI. The second major development--in addition to these new missiles--is a new deployment pattern.

(MAP, Soviet ICBM Deployment)
(PHOTO, single-silo complex)

A. We have found isolated single silos under construction in contrast to the former clustered launch sites where, in effect, several launchers constituted a single aiming point for a US missile strike.

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B. As of today, we have detected about 90 single silos, like the ones shown in this photograph. They are being built at the seven new complexes indicated by circles on the map, and at the three older complexes shown as black stars. These new silos are still grouped in complexes, but in the new deployment pattern they are from three to six miles apart.

1. We believe that many of these silos will be finished some time this year.

VII. The Soviets also have approximately 750 launchers for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

(MAP, MRBM/IRBM deployment)

A. About 90 percent of these launchers are in the western USSR, where their missiles could deliver a devastating attack--as much as 2,000 megatons--against targets in Europe and the Middle East.

B. The remaining launchers are targeted against South Asia, Japan, and Alaska.

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

VIII. The Soviet submarine strategic strike force consists of about 80 missile-carrying submarines. None is as effective as our Polaris subs.

(CHART, submarine types)

A. Ballistic missile submarines include types which fire 350-mile missiles from the surface, and possibly a few which can fire 700-mile missiles from beneath the surface.

B. Cruise missile subs include types equipped to fire 300-mile and 450-mile cruise missiles from the surface. One class is nuclear powered and carries six to eight such missiles.

C. We believe that a new class of nuclear submarine firing the 700-mile submerged-launch ballistic missile will shortly be brought into service.

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IX. Soviet submarines now are conducting longer range clandestine patrols with greater frequency. These patrols observe stringent communications security measures and show a greater realization of the needs of wartime operations. We expect them to be conducting regular patrols throughout the North Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean by the end of this decade. A Soviet nuclear submarine may have been 40 to 50 miles off the mouth of the Columbia River last week. That would be the closest a Soviet nuclear submarine has been to our waters.

SOVIET AIR DEFENSES

I. The Soviets have given defense against strategic attack a high priority in their military planning, They allocate about 20 percent of the total military budget to this purpose.

II. This investment has bought the Soviets a good defense against manned bombers penetrating the Soviet Union at medium and high altitudes--which was the main threat of the 1950s.

A. Soviet antiaircraft defenses have not, however, proved dependable against the sophisticated attack techniques which have developed in recent years, and the Soviets are trying to improve these defenses.

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III. The current Soviet air defense system is equipped with an impressive quantity and variety of weapons deployed in depth, including 1,200 surface-to-air missile sites and several thousand jet fighters supported by an extensive ground radar and control network.

A. The SA-2, the type of surface-to-air missile system deployed to Cuba, is the mainstay of Soviet surface-to-air missile defenses, backed up by the low-altitude SA-3.

(PHOTO, SA-2 site)

1. This is a photograph of an SA-2 site in Cuba, taken from an aircraft flying at about 500 feet.

B. The fighter interceptor force is very large, but only about one-third of the force is equipped for all-weather operations, and less than one-fourth have air-to-air missiles.

SOVIET ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE AND SPACE DEFENSES

I. For eight years now we have been watching intensive Soviet efforts directed toward the development of an antiballistic missile capability.

A. The magnitude of this development effort, together with early moves to deploy at least

one ABM system, indicates a stong intent to obtain ABM defenses rapidly.

B. There are a number of developments in widely separated parts of the Soviet Union which all appear to have some relationship to the development of an advanced air defense system. In many cases, construction is not yet far enough along for us to determine exactly what function the installation will have, or how it will fit in with other facilities.

(MAP, ABM and associated facilities)

II. After a period of testing at the Sary Shagan range, the Soviets apparently committed themselves to the deployment of an ABM system at Leningrad starting in 1960. This system probably was intended for defense against both missiles and aircraft, but it appeared to have little capability against sophisticated missile attack.

(PHOTO, Leningrad NW Complex)

A. This complex, 37 miles northwest of Leningrad, was first seen under construction in June 1961. It has five launch sites, each with six curved buildings. There is

also a launch control center under construction, and a probable electronics facility.

(PHOTO, Leningrad launch site)

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III. The Leningrad deployment was interrupted in late 1962 or early 1963, at a time when testing on new or modified systems began at Sary Shagan.

(PHOTO and MAP, Tallinn air defense complex)

IV. The Soviets now appear to be deploying a new system at Leningrad and two other places in the northwestern USSR. About a year ago they began to build two large sites, of 30 launch positions each, at Tallinn, shown here, and at Cherepovets, north of Moscow. The installations at Leningrad also appear to be for the same weapons system.

A. We are not yet certain, however, whether it is an ABM facility or a long-range system against attacks by aircraft or stand-off missiles.

V. We have also spotted a possible ABM system being built at Moscow. Construction began early in 1963.

A. We have found one large radar under construction southeast of Moscow, as well as electronic facilities, similar to some at Sary Shagan, being installed at four other sites around Moscow.

B. We cannot yet confirm that all these new facilities are part of an ABM system--some of them may represent improvements in Moscow's defense against aircraft launching standoff air-to-surface missiles.

(PHOTO, ABM shown in November parade)

C. This is one of the new missiles displayed in the November 7 parade. The Soviets described it as an antiballistic missile. From our analysis, we estimate that it could have an intercept mission against ballistic missiles, with a high altitude capability of a few hundred miles, and a slant range of several hundred miles.

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(PHOTO, Large tracking radars at Angarsk)

VI. In addition to their ABM programs, the Soviets are constructing an extensive space surveillance radar system at Angarsk and Sary Shagan.

A. The size, power and placement of these new radar complexes suggest that they are components of an anti-satellite weapons system. They are very expensive, and provide a space tracking capability which exceeds Soviet requirements for tracking either US or Soviet space vehicles. They are not properly located for early warning.

B. We must, therefore, be alert to the possibility that they may be directed toward an anti-satellite role which could be intended,

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in effect, to "blind" us in our gathering of photographic intelligence.

1. The State Department agrees that these radars could be used in an anti-satellite system, but considers deployment of such a system within the next two years unlikely because of cost; moreover, the State Department notes the political and other disadvantages which the Soviets would probably see in attacking US satellites.

(PHOTO, BMEWS at Olenegorsk)
(MAP, BMEWS field from Olenegorsk)

C. There is a similar installation going in at Olenegorsk, well north of Moscow. From the location and direction of these radars, we believe that they will have a ballistic missile early warning function, but they could have a space surveillance role as well.

VII. Frankly, these air defense developments I have just summarized are an enigma as long as our evidence remains as incomplete as it is at present.

A. The status of construction at some of these facilities does not yet permit an accurate

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analysis of the Soviet state of the art of air defense.

B. For the time being, we can only conclude that the Soviets are embarked on some unexplained approach to a defense system against either ballistic missiles or aircraft, with a strong possibility that they either have, or are at least approaching, a new technique.

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THE SOVIET ECONOMY

I. The development of this large and diversified military establishment has been expensive and has imposed considerable strain on the economy.

   A. The mass deployment of many advanced weapons systems was responsible for part of the slowdown in Soviet economic growth which has occurred over the past five years.

II. Our new estimate on the Soviet economy, however, is that the economy can continue to support a vigorous military and space program.

   A. Expenditures on these programs may level off between now and 1970. On the other hand, they might continue to rise by as much as 20 percent. In either event, the economy will continue to grow.

B. In short, we do not estimate that economic pressures will inexorably drive the Soviet Union to cut arms spending drastically or accept new arms control measures.

III. In closing this review of the Soviet military posture, I would like to stress two points.

A. The first is the nature of the substantial research and development efforts which are going on in the USSR. I believe that the Soviet leaders have made a basic decision to pursue--with energy and imagination--the qualitative improvement of their military forces. The emphasis is on upgrading the effectiveness of existing forces and pushing deeper into the frontiers of military science.

1. The Soviets have probably concluded that they cannot out-spend us and match us in quantity. However, they can and are willing to devote substantial funds and resources to research for improved weapons. In short, I look for them, over the next few years at least, to concentrate on quality, not quantity.

B. Secondly, I want to impress on you the sensitive nature of the information contained in this discussion of the Soviet military forces.

1. The Soviets go to great efforts to deny us even the most general information on their troops, their equipment, and particularly their plans for new weapons systems. It costs the United States and our allies a great deal of money and manpower to pierce the Soviet screen of secrecy. I want to keep the Soviets guessing as to the degree of our success in doing this.

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